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The ‘Virtual Hand' of Jihad
By Scott Atran
The presidential commission on WMDs and the 9/11 commission have condemned the status quo 
mentality of the intelligence community, which they see as being preoccupied with today's 
"current operations" and tactical requirements, and inattentive to tomorrow's far-ranging 
problems and strategic solutions. Both commissions call for steps to improve analysis and 
encourage diversity, including routine critiques of finished intelligence and alternative 
assessments by outside experts. But the overriding emphasis in both commissions' reports is on 
further vertically integrating intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Such proposals to 
centralize intelligence and unify command and control are not promising given recent 
transformations in Jihadist networks in the wake of al-Qaeda's operational demise.
‘Born-Again' Islam: Apocalyptic, Not Nihilistic 
Notwithstanding some atavistic cultural elements, Jihadism is a thoroughly modern movement 
filling a significant portion of the popular political void in Islamic societies left in the wake of 
locally discredited western ideologies. Appeals to Muslim history and calls for a revival of the 
Caliphate are important and deeply heartfelt, yet to a considerable extent Jihadism is also a 
counter-movement to the ideological – and corresponding military - thrust ensconced in the 
National Security Strategy of the United States, which enshrines liberal democracy as the "single 
sustainable model of national development… right and true for every person, in every society - 
and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies." 
As with most historical counter-movements, this one incorporates some of the main social and 
spiritual missions of its adversary. Indeed, perhaps more may be learned about Jihadism's 
apocalyptic yearnings and its "Born Again" vision of personal salvation through radical action 
from the New Testament's Book of Revelations than from the Qur'an. [1] Nor does Islam per se 
or "Muslim civilization" really have anything to do with terrorism – no more than some impossibly 
timeless or context-free notion of Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism or Buddhism can be held 
responsible for the dead millions these religious traditions have been accused of. 
One of the most important post 9/11 developments in global network Jihad is that surviving al-
Qaeda offshoots and newly emerging Jihadist groups and cells no longer consider themselves to 
be territorially rooted in supporting populations. For example, although Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al-
Jamaat al-Islamiyya, EIJ) and Egyptian Islamic Group (Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, EIG) have 
common roots in Egyptian society, the EIJ leadership under Dr. Ayman Zawahiri left Egypt to join 
Bin Laden in Afghanistan whereas EIG remained behind, glued to its base of popular support in 
Upper Egypt. [2] The hostile reaction of the local population to the 1997 massacre of 58 tourists 
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in Luxor, and the subsequent government crackdown and economic downturn, effectively halted 
EIG's ability to mount military operations. By contrast, Zawahiri continues to urge Jihadists 
everywhere to inflict the greatest possible damage and cause the maximum casualties on the 
West, regardless of the immediate consequences. 
Unconstrained by concrete concerns for what will happen to any population that supports them, 
uprooted Jihadists can seriously imagine fulfillment of their apocalyptic vision. But it is nonsense 
to claim that al-Qaeda and its sympathizers have no morality and simply want to annihilate 
Western civilization. In general, charges of "nihilism" against an adversary usually reflect the 
willful ignorance of those leveling the charge regarding their adversary's moral framework.
Current risk management approaches to countering terrorism often assume adversaries model 
the world on the basis of rational choices that are commensurable across cultures. But for the 
would-be martyrs I have interviewed it often doesn't matter that others will reap the rewards of 
their sacrifice. Neither does it seem to matter for those who issue religious edicts (fatwahs) 
condoning Jihadist martyrdom if the martyr kills thousands of foes or no one but himself – he will 
attain Paradise just the same. When I ask questions of the sort: "So what if your family were to 
be killed in retaliation for your action?" or "What if your father were dying and your mother found 
out your plans for a martyrdom attack and asked you to delay until the family could get back on 
its feet?" To a person the would-be suicide bombers I interview answer along the lines that there 
is duty to family and duty to God but duty to the latter cannot be postponed. Such answers, if 
sincere (and I have little doubt they are), suggest that devotional values are not very sensitive to 
standard calculations of cost and benefit, to quantity or to tradeoffs across different moral and 
cultural frameworks. This means that traditional calculations of how to defeat or deter an enemy 
(for example by eliminating top operatives or threatening destruction of supporting populations) 
may not succeed.
The Jihadist Diaspora: Rootless and Dynamic
Many of the most effective and enduring terrorist movements of modern times originated with, 
and have been sustained by, diaspora communities, often led by student immigrants who later 
import radical ideology and terrorist methods into the national movements of their home 
territories. Examples include the anarchist "Black Hand," the Boston-bred IRA, the PLO's exile 
leadership, and the British Commonwealth's Tamil Tiger support groups. Similarly, for al-Qaeda 
and the global Jihadist network that claims inspiration from it, over 80% of known activists live in 
diaspora communities. [3]
Arguably the greatest potential terrorist threat in the world today lies with uprooted and 
egalitarian Muslim young adults in European cities, who provided the manpower for both the 
9/11 and Madrid train-bombing attacks. Immigrant integration into European societies has 
always been more difficult than in America, being more state-driven and "top down" than 
community-based and "bottom up." In Europe "multiculturalism" is taken not as valuing diversity 
but as a sign of withdrawal – an attempt to create alien entities between the individual and state. 
[4] There is no indication that any rival to Jihadism's uncompromising vision of a fair and just 
society – which debriefings show clearly motivate these people - is being conveyed to would-be 
Jihadist youth in Europe. 
The European Union's increasingly open society is currently more favorable to far-flung 
networking among Jihadists than to an efficient coordination among different government 
services that remain hidebound to national territories and politics, and to professional hierarchies 
and traditional languages. The steep decline in birth rate among native Europeans, which is 
highest in southern European countries most accessible to immigration from North Africa and the 
Middle East, and rising need for immigrant labor will only exacerbate the problem. 
‘The Virtual Hand' of Global Jihad
Despite claims to the contrary, there is no longer the controlling agency of the al-Qaeda 
leadership to target, which seems to be operationally near dead: remnants of the mostly 
Egyptian hardcore around Bin Laden have not managed an attack in over two years, don't know 
who many of the new terrorists are, and can't communicate secretly with those they do know. 
Instead, groups of friends and family originating from the same area "back home" in North Africa 
or the Middle East, or from similar European housing projects and marginal neighborhoods, bond 
into action as they surf Jihadist websites on the internet to find direction from al-Qaeda's 
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inspiration. 
Analyzing case studies of nearly 500 globally-networked Jihadists (again, over 80% live in 
diaspora communities) University of Pennsylvania forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman, a former 
intelligence case officer who ran operations during the Afghan-Soviet War, finds that the social 
networks of these hard-to-penetrate militant groups are composed of about 20% kin and 70% 
friends (who tend to become kin over time through intermarriage). [5] Most operational cells of 
Jihadists have only a few members – cells of eight members seem to be the mode. Although the 
members of each cell usually show remarkable in-group homogeneity (age, birthplace, residence, 
education, socio-economic status, food likings etc.) there is little homogeneity across the Jihadist 
diaspora (which renders attempts at profiling global Jihadists worthless). Cells are often 
spontaneously formed and self-mobilizing, with few direct physical contacts to other cells. 
But radicalization usually requires outside input from, and interaction with, the larger Jihadist 
community. Radicalization is proceeding apace with exponential growth in internet connections 
(in the last five years active Jihadist websites has increased from 14 to over 4000). Personal 
bonds formed without physical contact on the internet appear to generate solid reputations for 
trustworthiness [6] and all the deep commitment that physical intimacy does, but often faster 
and over a wider set of personal relations.
Thus, a self-organized group of friends, like the would-be Madrid bomber plotters, may read an 
internet text, like "Iraqi Jihad" that suggests bombing Spanish trains to force that country's 
withdrawal from the US-led coalition in Iraq. Chatting with like-minded Jihadists on the web, the 
group of friends metamorphoses into a Jihadist cell and – in just a few weeks – an "amateur" plot 
is hatched and devastatingly executed (unlike the 5 years or so it took al-Qaeda to plan and 
execute 9-11). [7] The fact that all of the plotters are caught or blow themselves up may have 
no effect on the ability of other groups to self-organize and remain motivated for another attack. 
A new and vibrant Jihadist "market" is emerging, which is decentralized, self-organizing and self-
adjusting. How do we deal with the "virtual hand" that regulates this growing world exchange? 
Raw police force and military power likely won't do the trick but only generate more protean 
forms of the Jihadist hydra.
Responses from the intelligence community are also not encouraging. The CIA's new director 
Porter Goss, in his inaugural appearance before Congress, simply reaffirmed the misleading 
impression that some specific group called "al-Qaeda" is out there planning bigger and better 
attacks, with the inference that hammering al- Qaeda should remain the principal occupation of 
America's "war on terror." And the best that people who advise the intelligence community seem 
to come up with for preventing another 9/11 or Madrid attack is to better combine "the three 
methodologies" that are almost guaranteed failures for anticipating catastrophic events: pattern 
projection, frequency and probability. [8] Tinkering with broken pots is not the answer. 
"It won't help matters to have a National Intelligence Director whose job is to prepare briefs to 
bring to the President every day or simply to coordinate intelligence products," former Attorney 
General Edwin Meese recently commented; "what we could use is a facilitator to bring people and 
ideas together, not another operative." [9] Indeed, given the novel and peculiar nature of the 
threat before us, what has been proposed and is currently being implemented – ever more 
hierarchical command and control - may be precisely the wrong way to go. What is needed is 
deployment of more diverse talent and flexible tools to grapple the variable and virtual hand of 
global network Jihad.
Scott Atran is director of research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, and 
Professor of anthropology and psychology at the University of Michigan.
Notes:
1. For an extreme example of convergence, compare Ayman al-Zawahiri's Knights Under the 
Prophet's Banner [trans. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, London, December 2, 2001, available at 
www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ayman_bk.html] and the works of White Supremacist ideologue 
William Pierce: for example, The Turner Diaries (National Alliance, Washington, DC, 1978), which 
ends with the hero ploughing his jet into the Pentagon on a successful suicide mission; also 
Pierce's analysis of the 9/11 attacks being carried out for the right reasons by the wrong people, 
Free Speech 7, November 2001, available at www.natvan.com/free-speech/fs0111c.html.
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2. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 
2004).
3. Robert Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11, Nixon 
Center Monograph, March 25, 2004, p. 6; available at 
www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf.
4. Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam (Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 2004).
5. Marc Sageman, Presentation to the World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel 
on Terrorism, Erice, Sicily, and personal communication, May 7, 2005.
6. Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, "Trust among Strangers in Internet Interactions," In 
Michael Baye (ed.), Advances in Applied Microeconomics, Vol. 11 (Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, 
2002).
7. Comisiones de investigación sobre el 11 de marzo de 2004, Congreso de los Deputados, 
Madrid, Session 13, 19 July 2004 and Session 30, 15 November 2004; available at 
www.losgenoveses.net/11M/CI_007.pdf and www.losgenoveses.net/11M/CI_017.pdf. Testimony 
before Spain's 11-M commission reveals failures of intelligence and imagination similar to those 
involved in 9/11.
8. Glen Segell, "Intelligence Methodologies Applicable to the Madrid Train Bombings, 2004," 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 18, pp. 221-238 (2005).
9. Edwin Meese, Remarks to the Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), University of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, April 3, 2004; and personal communication, April 6, 2005. 
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